Recent Decisions by Editors, Various
Volume 6 Issue 2 Article 6 
1960 
Recent Decisions 
Various Editors 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Torts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Various Editors, Recent Decisions, 6 Vill. L. Rev. 245 (1960). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol6/iss2/6 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor of Villanova 
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. 
WINTER 1960-61]
RECENT DECISIONS
AGENCY-MASTER AND SERVANT-RELEASE OF EMPLOYER LIABLE
UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR DOES NOT
RELEASE SERVANT.
Hamm v. Thompson (Colo. 1960).
This was an action for damages sustained when an automobile driven
by the defendant, but owned by his employer, collided with an automobile
owned and driven by one of the plaintiffs. At trial, the complaint against
the employer was dismissed pursuant to a stipulation1 between the em-
ployer and the plaintiff. Defendant-driver then made a motion for a di-
rected verdict on the ground that a release of one joint tortfeasor releases
all. The motion was denied, and after the jury returned a verdict for
plaintiff, a judgment was entered by the District Court, City and County
of Denver, against the defendant-driver. He appealed to the Colorado
Supreme Court, which held that the employer was liable under the
doctrine of respondeat superior for injuries caused by the negligence of
his employee, but a release of the employer did not constitute a release of
the defendant-driver. Hamm v. Thompson, 353 P.2d 73 (Colo. 1960).
A majority of jurisdictions treat the master and servant 2 as joint
tortfeasors3 per se. Some do so without any examination of the basis of
their liability, 4 while others recognize that they are not joint tortfeasors in
1. Plaintiff had executed and delivered to the employer, in consideration of
seven hundred and fifty dollars, a document entitled "covenant not to sue," which
the court in the instant case construed to be a release. See note 10, infra for a dis-
cussion of the distinction between "covenant not to sue" and "release."
2. The principles discussed in this note might well be applicable to other
situations of primary and secondary liability, i.e. where the one primarily liable
is so because of his active participation, while the one secondarily liable is so due
to his relationship to the acting party. An obvious example, which some authorities
would include in the master-servant relationship, is that of principal and agent.
Other examples are seen in the situations where the retailer is liable for the sale
of food which was prepared and sold to him by the wholesaler without disclosure
of its condition; where the municipality is liable for the property owner's negligent
maintenance of the sidewalk; where the owner of property is liable for the negligence
of others on the property.
3. It is important to note that there is a fundamental difference between joining
parties in one action, and considering them as joint tortfeasors. The former is a
procedural expedient, the latter a rule of substantive law. Therefore the mere
joining of master and servant in a single action should not, by itself, designate themjoint tortfeasors. Kabatchnick v. Hanover-Elm Bldg. Co., 331 Mass. 366, 199 N.E.2d
169 (1954).
4. MacDonald v. Hornblower, 268 Mich. 262, 256 N.W. 572 (1934); Hunt
v. Ziegler, 271 S.W. 936 (Tex. 1925).
(245)
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the true sense. 5 Consequently, these jurisdictions apply the same rules
relating to release in the master-servant situation as they do in "true"
joint tortfeasor situations. Most of these courts still follow the common
law rule that a release of one joint tortfeasor releases all, whether or
not the injured plaintiff has been compensated or has made a reserva-
tion, in the release, of his cause of action against the non-released joint
tortfeasor.7 The modern trend however, has been to avoid this harshness,
and hence some courts, in determining whether the release should be
given its common law effect, inquire whether plaintiff has expressed any
intention in his release to preserve his rights against remaining joint tort-
feasors, or whether in fact the release actually has been a full satisfac-
tion." Also, many courts9 have retreated from the strict rule of the
common law by making a seemingly superficial distinction between a
release and a "covenant not to sue." 10 These courts treat a "covenant not
to sue" as preservative of plaintiff's cause of action in contradiction to the
harsh common law effect which they generally give a release. Some
courts, as in the instant case, consider the master-servant relationship
as deserving of special treatment, and will not apply the strict common
law rule that a release of one joint tortfeasor releases all.1
Although the tort liability of master and servant has some of the
characteristics of the liability of "true" joint tortfeasors, 2 there are
substantial differences which indicate that the former relationship should
receive preferential treatment. The master has participated"3 neither in
5. Magidson v. Bloom, 170 Misc. 832, 11 N.Y.S.2d 324 (N.Y. City Ct. 1939);
McLaughlin v. Seigle, 166 Va. 374, 185 S.E. 873 (1936).
6. By "true" joint tortfeasors is meant several persons each of whom is
personally guilty.of negligent conduct which is the legal cause of a single injury
to another. This would exclude the master-servant relationship. The Restatement
likewise takes this position, designating such tortfeasors as "contributing wrong-
doers." See RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 875, comment a at 434 (1939). But see
UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFVASORS ACT § 1, adopted in eight states, in
which the master and servant are considered joint tortfeasors, but which does not
give a release its common law effect.
7. See PROSSER, TORTS 243 (2d ed. 1955).
8. McKenna v. Austin, 134 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Harmon v. Givens, 88
Ga. App. 629, 77 S.E.2d 223 (1953).
9. Morrison v. Combs, 24 F. Supp. 366 (S.D. Me. 1939); Lewis v. Johnson,
12 Cal. 2d 558, 86 P.2d 99 (1939).
10. These courts reason that by a "covenant not to sue," plaintiff does not
surrender his cause of action but merely agrees he will not enforce it, and that
he becomes liable for an equivalent amount of damages if he does. However, these
same courts consider that plaintiff, in executing a release has surrendered his
cause of action. See PROSSER, TORTS 244 (2d ed. 1955).
11. Wright v. McCord, 205 Ala. 122, 88 So. 150 (1920) ; Losito v. Kruse,
136 Ohio St. 183, 24 N.E.2d 705 (1940).
12. The master and servant may be joined as defendants in a single action, or
may be sued in separate actions at the option of the plaintiff. East Boarl Top
Transit Co. v. Flood, 326 Pa. 353, 192 Ati. 401 (1937). Each is liable for the
entire actual damages. 1 MEECHgM LAW OF AGENCY § 1462 (2d ed. 1914). A
judgment against one is no bar to a suit against the other, and only satisfaction of
the judgment extinguishes the claim against them. Sherwood v. Huber & Huber
Motor Exp. Co., 286 Ky. 775, 151 S.W.2d 1007 (1941).
13. Of course if the master has participated he would be a "true" joint tort-
feasor.
[VOL. 6.
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the planning nor in the consummation of the tort; his liability is based
instead on the doctrine of respondeat superior, which has its origins
in the law of agency. 14 Thus the liability of the negligent employee is
"primary"; that of the employer is "secondary."' 5 A difference also is
evident in the master's right of reimbursement from the servant for all
expenditures made in discharging his respondeat superior obligation.'6
A negligent joint tortfeasor, however, by the weight of authority, has
no right of contribution in the absence of statute,' 7 and if he does have
this right, recovery will be limited to that amount expended beyond
his pro rata share. Moreover, the liability of the master and servant
is not interchangeable, and while the master may be liable although the
servant alone committed the tort, the servant will not be liable where
the tort has been committed solely by the master. Furthermore it should be
noted that, though there are few cases giving special consideration to
the problem of the release of the master, the general rule is that a re-
lease of the servant releases the master.' 8 The courts are aware of the
uniqueness of the master-servant relationship in this situation, and recog-
nize that the master's liability is predicated solely on that of his servant.
In addition, were the master not released, he would be deprived of his
right of indemnity from the servant, for the servant could set up the
release as a defense of no liability.19
In the "true" joint tortfeasor situation, the modern trend has been
away from the strict common law rule20 that a release of one joint tort-
feasor releases all. It is suggested that this trend should be further
accelerated when dealing with the master-servant release situation.21 In
the true joint tortfeasor situation, all the tortfeasors actively take part in
causing the injury of which the plaintiff complains. The acts of each,
14. See 1 HARPgR & JAMES, THg LAW OF TORTS, 699, 700 (1956).
15. Albers v. Great Central Transp. Co., 145 Ohio St. 129, 60 N.E.2d 699
(1945). See note 2 supra for discussion of primary-secondary terminology.
16. Martz Couch Co. v. Hudson Bus Transp. Co., 133 N.J.L. 342, 44 A.2d
488 (1945) ; RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 896, and comment a (1937).
17. See PRossER, TORTS 247, 248 (2d ed. 1955).
18. Giles v. Smith, 80 Ga. App. 540, 56 S.E.2d 860 (1949); Johns v. Hake, 15
Wash. 651, 131 P.2d 933 (1942).
19. Ibid.
20. Some of the reasons advanced for the dissatisfaction with the common law
rule are: that the claimant must forego either compromise with one tortfeasor or
his claim against the other where there is an opportunity to settle with one of the
joint tortfeasors; that the rule stifles compromise; that it is a trap for the unwary
releasor; that often it disregards the intent of the parties and also prevents full
compensation; that it discharges the wrongdoer who does not contribute; and that
its result is generally unjust and unintended. 12 VAND. L. Rgv. 1415 (1959).
21. The Court in the instant case argued that if the master and servant are
treated as joint tortfeasors, and a release of the master releases the servant, then
the servant, who is the sole wrongdoer, would escape liability altogether. The
master, after compensating the injured party, could not seek contribution by way
of indemnification, there being no contribution among joint tortfeasors. However,
this argument would seem to hold little weight, for as a rule all jurisdictions
recognize the master's right of indemnification whether or not he be considered a
joint tortfeasor. See Betcher v. McChesney, 255 Pa. 394, 100 Att. 124 (1917);
UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFASORS AcT § 6, which specifically preserves
the right of indemnity though it considers master and servant as joint tortfeasors.
WINTER 1960-61 ]
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with their attendant liability, are interrelated with the acts of the others,
and together result in an indivisible injury which defies separation of
respective fault.22 Therefore, when the proponents of the common law
rule declare that the indivisible injury must exist or vanish in entirety,
and that hence a release immediately affects this entirety, there is some
merit to the argument. On the other hand, although the master and
servant may both be liable for injury to the plaintiff, their degree of
fault is easily separated. Their liability stems from different sources the ser-
vant's from his tortious actions, the master's out of the rule of respondeat
superior. Each has a separate liability in himself, readily ascertainable
by looking solely to the servant's negligence. The common law rule is
further justifiable on the basis that a plaintiff should not be able to
create degrees of liability as between wrongdoers. 23 By releasing one and
suing the other, it is said that one wrongdoer thereby receives favored
treatment. In the master-servant relationship, however, the master is
not a participating wrongdoer, and the servant, who is the sole cause
of the injury and the sole negligent party, should not be heard to
complain that the onus of the lawsuit has been placed on him. It is
interesting to note that the main reason cited by courts who refuse
to abandon the strict common law rule of release as applied in the
master-servant situation, is that it will result in an inequity to the ser-
vant.24 These courts reason that if the servant is not released he will
be forced to pay the whole amount of the injury, in addition to the
amount necessary to indemnify the master from any amount expended by
the master in securing his release. This objection suggests a solution
in the specific situation of the instant case, where a release of the
master is involved. Courts, recognizing the separate identity of the
parties, should not deem a release of the master to be a release of the
servant unless the release so provides. Nevertheless, the release should
reduce the claim against the servant to the extent of the amount of the
consideration paid for the release. 25 Thus plaintiff would receive no
more than the amount his injury is judged to be worth, and defendant-
servant could not complain that the master's exercise of his right of
indemnification results in his paying more than his just due.
John V. Hasson
22. Hartigan v. Dickson, 81 Miss. 284, 83 N.W. 1091 (1900).
23. Price v. Baker, 352 P.2d 90, 92 (Colo. 1959).
24. Gavin v. Malherbe, 261 N.Y.S. 373, 376 (Sup. Ct. 1932).
25. This was the solution promulgated in Losito v. Kruse, 136 Ohio St. 183,
24 N.E.2d 705 (1940). It is interesting to note that although the court in the
instant case quoted from the Losito case, and used it as authority for its decision
that a release would not extinguish the plaintiff's cause of action, it did not seem to
adopt Losito's solution of pro tanto satisfaction.
4
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEnom OF SPEECH-TERMINATION OF
VETERAN'S DISABILITY BENEFITS BECAUSE OF COMMUNIST SPEECHES
BY RECIPIENT.
Thompson v. Whittier (D.D.C. 1960).
Plaintiff, a World War II veteran receiving disability compensation
for a war injury, had been convicted under the Smith Act for his
Communist activities. Subsequently; at several Communist Party meetings
during the Korean conflict, he made abusive speeches criticizing our
participation in the conflict. Thereafter, the Administrator of Veteran's
Affairs, pursuant to a federal statute' which empowered him to determine
when a veteran had forfeited his V.A. benefits by rendering aid to an
enemy of the United States, decided that plaintiff had lost his right
to disability benefits. He based his decision solely on the anti-war
speeches; evidence of plaintiff's Smith Act conviction and Communist
party membership was introduced only to show that his purpose in
giving the speeches was to aid the Communist cause. Plaintiff appealed
to the Board of Veteran's Appeals, 2 and after a full hearing the prior
action was affirmed and a request for reconsideration denied. This
action was brought in the District Court for the District of Columbia
to set aside the termination of payments. Plaintiff moved for a sum-
mary judgment, claiming the statute was unconstitutional as a bill of
attainder, an ex post facto law, as lacking in due process and as failing
to formulate a definite standard of guilt. Defendant's cross motion for
summary judgment was granted by the court, which held that the
statute does not seek to impose an additional punishment for the offenses
therein enumerated, but merely prescribes additional qualification for
eligibility to receive a gratuity. The dissenting opinion, however, argued
that applying the statute to plaintiff's speeches would be an obvious re-
striction on free speech, and thus would require a determination by the
court of the constitutionality of such a limitation. Thompson v. Whittier,
185 F. Supp. 306 (D.D.C. 1960).
When a statute imposes punishment on a party for his actions
there are certain constitutional restrictions placed on it;3 these limita-
tions however, apply only to punitive statutes and not to those which
merely set up standards for the qualification for, or termination of,
privileges gratuitously granted. When the source of legislative concern
appears to be the activity or status from which an individual is barred,
1. 72 STAT'. 1240 (1958), 38 U.S.C. § 3504(a) (1958): "Any person shown by
evidence satisfactory to the Administrator to be guilty of mutiny, sabotage, treason
or rendering assistance to an enemy of the United States or of its allies shall forfeit
.all accrued or future gratuitous benefits under laws administered by the Veterans'
Administration."
2. An appeal agency within the Veterans' Administration.
3. E.g., it must not be a bill of attainder, an ex post facto law, etc.
WINTER 1960-61]
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his disqualification therefrom is not punishment even though it may
bear harshly on the one affected; the contrary is true where the statute
is evidently aimed at the person or class disqualified.4 It is this reasoning
which has led to conclusions that deportation,5 disqualification from medi-
cal practice,6 and deprivation of social security payments7 were not
punishments for past crimes; the court here has held that termination of
disability benefits also is not basically punitive.8 However, unlike the
other non-punitive disqualifications listed above, it would appear that the
instant case involved a potential infringement upon free' speech.9 Re-
quiring a loyalty oath in order to use NLRB facilities,' 0 to obtain public
employment," or as a condition for candidacy for public office 12 have
all been held to be abridgements of free speech. So also, the Supreme
Court has said'8 that there was not any doubt that denial of a tax ex-
emption on account of certain speeches a party made was a limitation
on that party's freedom of speech. Thus the logical inference would seem
to be that denial of disability benefits due to speeches made by a veteran
is a limitation on the veteran's free speech. The traditional test of the
constitutionality of such a limitation has been that the words used must
present a clear and present, 14 or more recently a clear and probable,'6
danger of bringing about an evil that the legislature has a right to
prevent. The distinction previously made,' 6 between those statutes specifi-
cally couched in speech terms and those which had general prohibitions
which were applied to speech, has been glossed over recently 17 with .,he
clear and probable test being universally applied. However, indirect sanc-
tions on speech may be allowable, regardless of the clear and probable
test, when they result from regulation of an appropriate legislative sub-
ject, the importance of which overrides the resultant indirect limitations
on speech.' 8
4. Flemming v. Nestor, 364 U.S. 137 (1960).
5. Fong Yueting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1892).
6. Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1897).
7. Flemming v. Nestor, 364 U.S. 137 (1960).
8. The basis is that the government can set up reasonable standards for the
grant of a gratuity, and making sure that the recipient does not bite the hand
that fed it is a reasonable condition.
9. Since the basis for the disqualification was the speeches made by plaintiff,
the question arises whether it is a limitation of the First Amendment free speech
guarantee to deny disability benefits on the basis of speeches made, where the
statute permitting such is drawn in non-speech terms.
10. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
11. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
12. Gerende v. Bd. of Sup'rs of Elections, 341 U.S. 56 (1951).
13. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
14. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1926); Schenk v. United States, 249
U.S. 47 (1919).
15. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
16. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
17. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1946); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516
(1945); West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
18. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950), which
upheld a section of the LMRA requiring union officials who wanted to go before
the NLRB to take oaths that they did not belong to the Communist Party nor
believe in violent overthrow of the government.
250 [VOL. 6.
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It would appear that the court should have explored the speech
issue more fully19 here, for where legislative regulation of a proper sub-
ject results in indirect, partial abridgement of speech, it is the court's
duty to determine which interest demands the greater protection under
the particular circumstances presented. 20  Applying the "clear and
probable" test to plaintiff's speeches, 21 it appears unlikely that they were
a sufficiently serious "rendering of aid to an enemy of the United States"
to make them a proper subject for the statute's aims. The interpretation
given in another case22 to the statute involved here was that Congress
had sought to equate the four enumerated offenses23 as those tending to
weaken our nation's position in the total war.24 It is difficult to see how
plaintiff's speeches could have such an impact as appears necessary to
sustain limitation upon them. True, Congress has the right to adopt
a "do not bite the hand that fed you" doctrine in setting up qualifications
for receiving a gratuity, but including in this classification anyone who
opposes our participation in a war, and thereby encroaching upon freedom
of speech, appears to be extending the doctrine too far. Treason, mutiny
and sabotage are certainly serious enough "bites"; the speech involved
here does not seem to be. Alternatively, it would seem that the ques-
tion of the constitutionality of the speech limitation could have been
avoided entirely by giving a different and seemingly more logical inter-
pretation to the statute. It is reasonable to assume that the fourth
category listed should resemble and be of about the same degree of
seriousness as the first three. Therefore, since speech is riot specifically
mentioned therein, the statute should be construed as inapplicable to
all critical speech, unless it would render substantial direct assistance to
19. The Court held that the Administrator's action was not subject to judicial
review. However, in Wellman v. Whittier, 259 F.2d 163 (D.D.C. 1958), it was
held that if the Administrator's ruling depends on an erroneous interpretation of
the law, it may be subject to review. Moreover, all the cases which were cited
by the court in the instant case as holding that prohibited conduct can include
speech alone involved treason trials in which the defendant had engaged in psycho-
logical warfare by broadcasting to the troops. They are distinguishable from the
instant case since all held that such speech is much more serious than mere criticism
of the government, and that only the former can amount to treason.
20. Ibid.
21. Among plaintiff's utterances were: "Mass action now can still halt a Police
State"; "American imperialism is hiding behind the skirts of the Negro G.I. in
Korea"; a demand for withdrawal of United States troops in Korea; criticism of
the "gigantic armaments program" and its costs; "The way of life of the working
people . . . daily becomes more cruelly affected and more viciously warped with each
war move of the Wall Street bankers and the Washington politicians"; references
to the war effort as "the savage Truman-MacArthur war of aggression"; etc.
22. Wellman v. Whittier, 259 F.2d 163 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
23. Mutiny, sabotage, treason and rendering aid to an enemy of the United
States.
24. The Court held in the Wellman case that Communist Party membership
is insufficient to support the charge of rendering help to the enemy and in dicta
suggested activities that weakened troop morale or interfered with the enlistment
program as conduct which might be sufficient.
WINTER 1960-61 ]
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our enemies 25 or is accomplished by conduct which would constitute a
crime. This construction then would require a finding that the Adminis-
trator exceeded the discretion vested in him, and result in the more
desirable holding that the termination be set aside.
Frederick M. Lavin
CONTRACTS-OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE-SEALED BID
INTERPRETED As ACCEPTANCE.
Jenkins Towel Service, Inc. v. Fidelity-Philadelphia
Trust Co. (Pa. 1960)
The Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. circulated a letter in which it
requested interested parties to submit sealed bids on certain real estate
which it owned as trustee. This property had been offered for sale on
the real estate market since March, 1956, and the trustees had carried
on separate negotiations with a number of parties but had been unable
to secure an acceptable price.' The letter stipulated that on June 24, 1956,
the bids were to be opened and that an agreement of sale would be
tendered "to the highest acceptable bidder whose offer is in excess of
92,000 dollars." 2 The trustee also reserved to itself the right to "approve
or disapprove of -any or all offers ' 3 and further recited its fiduciary duty
to recommend "the most advantageous offer. ' 4 Plaintiff submitted an
unqualified bid of 92,500 dollars, 5 and when Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust
Co. refused to effect an agreement of sale, plaintiff sued for specific
performance. 6 The court of common pleas dismissed the bill, but on
25. An example would be demoralizing the troops by radio broadcasts of
propaganda. Chandler v. United States, 171 F.2d 921 (1st Cir. 1948) ; Gilars v.
United States, 182 F.2d 962 (D.D.C. 1950).
1. During April, 1959, Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. offered to sell this real
estate to the plaintiff for $85,000. The plaintiff submitted a counter-offer of $82,500
which the trustee declined.
2. Jenkins Towel Service, Inc. v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., 400 Pa. 98,
101, 161 A.2d 334, 336 (1960).
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Esso Standard Oil Co. was the only other party which had submitted a bid.
It also bid $95,600, but its bid was conditioned upon approval by its New York
office, and upon the granting of a zoning variance to permit the construction of a
gasoline filling station on the property in question. Jenkins Towel Service, Inc. v.
Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., 400 Pa. 98, 102, 161 A.2d 334, 336 (1960).
6. The original bill of Jenkins Towel Service, Inc. also contained a prayer for aninjunction to restrain Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. from seeking a zoning variance
of the type stipulated in the Esso bid. Jenkins Towel Service, Inc. v. Fidelity-
Philadelphia Trust Co., 400 Pa. 98, 99, 161 A.2d 334, 335 (1960).
[VOL. 6.
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appeal the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
trustee's letter was ambiguous and, construing it most strongly against
the author, that it amounted to an offer to sell real estate which the
appellant accepted by submitting an unqualified sealed bid in excess of the
required minimum. Jenkins Towel Service, Inc. v. Fidelity-Philadelphia
Trust Co., 400 Pa. 98, 161 A.2d 334 (1960).
The principles of interpretation used by the court, namely that a
written contract which contains an ambiguity is construed most strongly
against the party drawing it,7 and that the entire fact complex may
be considered in ascertaining the intention of the parties,8 have found
almost universal acceptance. Alternatively, the proposition that a bid is
merely an offer to enter into a contract has likewise been generally undis-
puted.' This principle originally developed in cases involving public
auction sales,10 and has since been applied with equal vigor to more re-
stricted contractual transactions effectuated by competitive bidding."
A request for competitive bids in which the seller reserves the right to
accept or reject any or all bids has long been categorized as preliminary
negotiation. 12 A sale at auction in which it is announced that the item will
be sold to the highest bidder is regarded as a sale without reserve, and
the highest bid submitted then operates as an acceptance.' 3 There are,
however, some early decisions which have held that a sale at auction
which is accompanied by such an announcement is a mere declaration of
intention to hold an auction at which bids will be received. 14 Pennsyl-
vania recognizes, by statute, the distinction between auction sales with
and without reserve and presumes a sale to be with reserve. 15 The fact
that the bids are to be sealed does not of itself vary the status of the
7. Betterman v. American Stores Co., 367 Pa. 193, 80 A.2d 66 (1951); Hempfield
Township School District v. Cavalier, 309 Pa. 460, 164 Atl. 602 (1932); White v.
Smith, 33 Pa. 186 (1854).
8. Brown v. Raub, 357 Pa. 271, 54 A.2d 35 (1950) ; Slonaker v. P. G. Publishing
Co., 338 Pa. 292, 13 A.2d 48 (1940); cf. Hindman v. Farren, 353 Pa. 33, 44 A.2d
241 (1949).
9. United States v. Lipman, 122 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1954) ; Olson v.
Beacham, 102 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1960).
10. Roundtree v. Todd, 210 Ga. 226, 78 S.E.2d 449 (1953); Anderson v. Wis-
consin Cent. Ry., 107 Minn. 296, 120 N.W. 39 (1909) ; Fisher v. Seltzer, 23 Pa.
308 (1854).
11. United States v. Sabin Metal Corp., 151 F. Supp. 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1957);
Olson v. Becham, 102 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1960). See also United States v. Zubik,
140 F. Supp. 922 (W.D. Pa. 1956).
12. Levinson v. United States, 258 U.S. 198 (1922); Holliday v. Highbee, 172
F.2d 316 (10th Cir. 1949) ; cf. State ex rel. Fitch v. State Board of School Land
Comm'rs, 191 Pac. 1073 (Wyo. 1920).
13. Zuhak v. Rose, 264 Wis. 286, 58 N.W.2d 693 (1953); Jones v. Hackensack
Auto Wreckers, Inc., 124 N.J.L. 289, 11 A.2d 595 (1940).
14. United States ex rel. Goldberg v. Daniels, 37 App. D.C. 282 (D.C. Cir.
1913), aff'd, 231 U.S. 218 (1913) ; Wheeler v. Slocinski, 82 N.M. 311, 131 Atl. 598
(1926) ; Anderson v. Wisconsin Cent. Ry., 107 Minn. 296, 120 N.W. 39 (1909).
15. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-328 (1953).
WINTER 1960-611
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instrument soliciting such bids,1 or of the bids themselves." Moreover,
it is not unusual for an instrument of preliminary negotiation of contracts
by competitive bidding to include particulars of the agreement which will
eventually bind the parties, but still retain its status as an instrument of
preliminary negotiation.'
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in construing as an offer Fidelity's
letter requesting the submission of sealed bids, ignored the fact that the
bids were referred to as offers on four occasions in the body of the
letter.19 The court regarded Fidelity's letter as ambiguous because it
promised, on the one hand, to sell to the highest acceptable bidder, but
also stated clearly that it reserved the right to accept or reject any or
all bids. The court did not regard as significant that Fidelity's alleged
promise was to sell to the highest acceptable bidder; however, if the
term acceptable meant that Fidelity could sell to any party which it
deemed acceptable, there would be no conflict between this alleged
promise and the subsequent reservation to the trustee of the power to
approve or disapprove of any or all bids. The court's interpretation of
the reservation clause as being operative only prior to the reception of
the bids is difficult to accept in view of the fact that such a clause would
be useless until the bids were opened and the terms of each were known.
The assertion that this clause might also operate if a bid did not con-
form to the conditions specified in the trustee's letter also is objectionable,
because a bid which did not conform to those conditions could not qualify
as an acceptance.2 0 The court, it would seem, has used rules governing
the interpretation of contracts to re-write into an offer, an instrument
which appears on its face to be merely a solicitation of offers. Whether
the peculiar prior negotiations between the parties, and the stipulation of
a minimum bid, which was 7,000 dollars in excess of the price at which
Fidelity had previously offered to sell the property to the plaintiff,
were sufficient reasons for this interpretation is at least debatable. The
majority of the court regarded the fact that the bids were sealed as a
factor which substantiated its conclusion that the plaintiff's bid operated
as an acceptance. It would seem likely that this assertion could very
well lead to a declining use of calls for sealed bids so as to avoid the
danger that such a solicitation might be interpreted as an offer. Moreover,
16. United States ex rel. Goldberg v. Daniels, 37 App. D.C. 282 (D.C. Cir.
1913) af'd, 231 U.S. 218 (1913).
17. United States v. Sabin Metal Corp., 151 F. Supp. 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1957);
Holliday v. Highbee, 172 F.2d 316 (10th Cir. 1949).
18. Rhode Island Tool Co. v. United States, 128 F. Supp. 417 (Ct. Cl. 1955);
cf. Berkeley Unified School Dist. v. James J. Barnes Constr. Co., 112 F. Supp.
396 (N.D. Cal. 1953).
19. The designation of a communication as an offer is not conclusive of its
status as such. Green v. Smith, 146 Va. 442,-131 S.E. 486 (1926). However, re-
peated reference to a communication as an offer is certainly strong evidence of
the fact that the communication was made with that purpose in mind.
20. Iselin v. United States, 271 U.S. 136 (1926) ; Broch v. Matterson, 298
111. 387, 131 N.E. 804 (1921) ; Lewis v. Tohrson, 123 Minn. 409, 143 N.W. 1127(1915).
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while it would appear that the instant case should be restricted to its
peculiar set of facts, its effect in future contract negotiations may well
be to discourage a seller from expressing his intention to accept the
highest bid in order that such an expression of intention would not be
misinterpreted by the courts to be a commitment.
John Fields
CONTRACTS-SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-CONFIRMATION BY COURT OF
ARBITRATION AWARD GRANTING SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF BUILDING
CONTRACT.
Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc. v. Iris Const. Corp. (N.Y. 1960).
Plaintiff and defendant entered into an agreement whereby defend-
ant, owner of real estate, was to construct thereon a building to be leased
by plaintiff for use as a retail department store. The store was to
be part of a shopping center and the estimated cost of construction was
five million dollars. The agreement contained an arbitration clause
whereby any disputes were to be settled in accordance with the rules
of the American Arbitration Association. After excavation was begun,
defendant, unable to obtain necessary mortgage money,' refused to con-
tinue building unless plaintiff agreed to pay an increase in rent. The
plaintiff refused and the dispute was taken to arbitration. The arbitrators
granted specific performance ordering the defendant to proceed in ac-
cordance with the agreement.2 The trial court confirmed the award and
on appeal the supreme court, appellate division, affirmed the decision.
The court of appeals also affirmed and held it was within the discretion
of the court to confirm the award of an arbitration board granting
specific performance of a building contract. Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc.
v. Iris Const. Corp., 8 N.Y. 2d 133, 168 N.E.2d (1960).
In general, courts do not grant specific performance of building and
construction contracts.3 The sufficiency of money damages 4 and the de-
gree of supervision necessary' for enforcement are the two major reasons
1. Defendant was refused mortgage money at twenty-seven different lending
institutions.
2. The parties had agreed that the arbitrators should have the power to give any
just and equitable remedy including specific performance.
3. Beck v. Allison, 56 N.Y. 366 (1874).
4. Oregonian R.R. v. Oregon R.R. & Nay. Co., 37 Fed. 733 (9th Cir. 1885).
5. Stanton v. Singleton, 126 Cal. 657, 59 Pac. 146 (1899). In Standard Fashion
Co. v. Siegal-Cooper Co., 157 N.Y. 60, 51 N.E. 408 (1898) it was held that super-
vision is prohibitive when the contract calls for the performance of varied and
continuous acts or acts which require the exercise of special skill and judgment.
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why the courts are reluctant to deviate from this time honored rule.
However, since it is within the discretion of the court 6 to grant such
action there are exceptions to the general rule. The relationship of the
parties is often an important factor in determining whether specific per-
formance will be granted. 7 For example, if the contract calls for de-
fendant to build on land controlled by the plaintiff, money damages
usually furnish an adequate remedy." But when, as in the instant case,
the defendant has agreed to build on land in his control, the courts are
less hesitant to grant specific performance.9 In fact, there has been a
trend toward providing such a remedy whenever the difficulties of en-
forcement are not extreme. 10 Here, however, the court is not affirming a
decree of a trial court, but is confirming an award made by arbitrators.1
Generally, an arbitration award will not be enforced if it is contrary to
public policy 12 or if it shocks good conscience.' Although the arbitrators'
award in the present case complies with the provisions of the New York
statute 14 dealing with arbitration and award it appears this is the first
time that specific performance of a construction contract of such magnitude
was awarded either as a result of arbitration or an initial proceeding in
the courts. 15
The court in the instant case can be criticized because it avoids de-
ciding whether the court must confirm an arbitration award if the
award complies with the New York statute concerning arbitration. If
the court were duty bound by this statute to confirm, there would be
no purpose in reviewing the decision. However, it does not appear from
reading the statute that the court was compelled to confirm the award.
Therefore, assuming that the court did have the power within its dis-
cretion to overturn the award, it would appear at least arguable that
the court, by failing to do so, abused its discretion, especially considering
the degree of supervision necessary to enforce the construction of this
6. Conger v. New York W.S. & B.R.R., 120 N.Y. 29, 23 N.E. 983 (1890).
7. Jones v. Parker, 163 Mass. 506, 40 N.E. 1044 (1895).
8. McCormick v. Cemetery of Mt. Auburn, 385 Mass. 548, 189 N.E. 585 (1934).
9. Depending on circumstances, specific performance generally is granted be-
cause without defendant's approval, plaintiff certainly cannot do work on defendant's
land. Strauss v. Estates of Long Beach, 187 App. Div. 876, 176 N.Y. Supp. 447 (1919).
10. Zygmunt v. Avenue Realty Co., 108 N.J. Eq. 462, 155 Atd. 544 (1931).
"[T]he court usually weighs on one side the difficulties of enforcing and supervising the
execution of the decree and on the other side of the balance, the importance of
specific performance to the complainant and the inadequacy of action for damages."
See also 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS 1172 (1951), 5 WILLISI'ON, CONTRACT'S 1423 (rev. ed.
1937).
11. In Fredyberg Bros. Inc. v. Corey, 177 Misc. 560, 31 N.Y.S.2d 10 (1941), it
was held that arbitrators are not bound by rules of law, but can grant relief where
courts of equity could not do so.
12. Staklinsky v. Pyramid Electric Co., 6 N.Y.2d 159, 160 N.E.2d 78 (1959).
13. Publishers' Assn. of N.Y.C. v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Union, 280
App. Div. 800, 114 N.Y.S.2d 401 (1952).
14. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. AcT § 1458, § 1460, § 1462. It does not appear from a reading
of the cited sections that there was any basis in the statute to overturn the award
of the arbitrators.
15. 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS 1172 (1951); 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS 1423 (rev. ed.
1937).
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five million dollar building project. As the dissenting judge indicates, it
would seem that the arbitrators did not adequately consider the difficulty
of judicial supervision and thus the court is burdened with the result
of the arbitrators' insufficient study of the matter. Moreover, since the
defendant was unable to obtain the necessary mortgage money he could
not possibly continue to build. The decision thus presents an anomaly,
for if it is financially impossible for defendant to comply with the award,
his failure to do so is not willful and therefore he should not be subject
to contempt. Judging from the difficulties which the confirmation of the
award presents, it would appear more desirable that courts retain their
discretionary power, unless of course prohibited by statute, to overrule
unwise arbitration awards rather than act merely as a "rubber stamp."' 6
Denis V. Brenan
EVIDENCE-DISCOVERY-RIGHT OF ACCUSED TO INSPECT PRE-TRIAL
STATEMENTS OF STATE'S WITNESSES.
State v. Lavallee (Vt. 1960).
Defendant was convicted of assault and robbery. On appeal the de-
fendant assigned as error, inter alia, the refusal of the trial court to grant
a motion, made at the beginning of the trial, to allow him to inspect all
relevant reports in the hands of the prosecution made by those who were
to testify on its behalf.' Further, on cross-examination of the victim of
the criminal acts, the defendant learned that the witness had given a
signed statement to the police soon after the event. Thereupon, the
defendant moved that the trial court order the state to produce any
such statement of the witness which was related to the subject matter
of his testimony. 2 This motion and others made at the commencement of
cross-examination of other state's witnesses, were denied by the trial
16. It should be noted that this would not diminish the efficacy of arbitration
proceedings in regard to reducing the congestion of the courts because whenever
there is a dispute over the award, the party seeking enforcement thereof must
appeal to the court.
1. ". . . order the State to produce for the inspection by the respondent all
reports of investigators, police officers and informers who are to testify at the
trial . . . touching the events and activities as to which they are to testify in the
trial . . . and . . . that any relevant statements or reports in the State's possession
of the State's witnesses touching the subject matter at the trial be given to the
respondent for inspection." State v. Lavellee, 163 A.2d 856, 857 (Vt. 1960).
2. ". . . to order the State to produce any statements of the witness in the
possession of the State which relate to the subject matter as to which the witness
has testified." Id. at 858.
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court. The Supreme Court of Vermont dismissed these assignments of
error, holding that an accused is not entitled to inspect, at the opening
of the trial, the statements of state witnesses. The court indicated in-
spection would be granted, however, after a determination of relevancy by
the trial judge, upon the commencement of cross-examination of the
witness. State v. Lavallee, 163 A.2d 856 (Vt. 1960).
At common law, an accused was not permitted to inspect docu-
ments in the hands of the prosecution before trial,3 and notice of the
testimony of any witness to be called by the prosecution was not re-
quired to be given the accused. 4 A number of jurisdictions profess ad-
herence to the view of the common law in this respect whether the
accused asks to inspect documents possessed by the prosecution before
trial,5 or at the commencement of the trial.6 An ever increasing number
of courts, however, have modified the common law rule.7 In fact, a num-
ber of states allow the accused to inspect pre-trial statements of prosecu-
tion witnesses in the possession of the state not only prior to the trial,
but also upon the conclusion of the witness' direct testimony.8 In Jencks
v. United States,9 the Supreme Court laid down the rule for the federal
courts, and held that an accused is entitled as of right to inspect the
pre-trial statements of a witness for the prosecution after the witness
has testified on direct examination, but that this right is restricted solely
to statements relating to the matters testified to on direct examination.
The Court said that the statements were to be given directly to the
3. 6 WIGMORZ, EVIDINCX § 18 59(g) (3d ed. 1940).
4. Id. § 1850.
5. McAden v. State, 155 Fla. 523, 21 So. 2d 33 (1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S.
723 (1945); State v. Shourds, 224 La. 955, 71 So. 2d 340 (1954) (confessions
excepted) ; Lopez v. State, 252 S.W.2d 701 (Tex, 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 893
(1952) State ex rel. Spencer v. Freedy, 198 Wis. 388, 223 N.W. 861 (1929).
6. Bellew v. State, 106 So. 2d 146 (Miss. 1958) (not reversible error), cert.
denied, and appeal dismissed 360 U.S. 473 (1959).
7. State ex rel. Sadler v. Lackey, 319 P.2d 610 (Okla. 1957) (discretionary,
but should be granted only for good cause shown). In In re DiJoseph, 394 Pa.
19, 145 A.2d 187 (1958) the special concurring opinions state the rule implicit
in the per curiam opinion, namely, that the trial judge in his discretion can allow
pre-trial inspection by the accused. State v. Payne, 25 Wash. 2d 407, 171 P.2d 227(1946) (discretionary).
8. Marby v. State, 110 So. 2d 260 (Ala. 1959), cert. dismissed, 110 So. 2d
260 (Ala. 1959). In People v. Estrada, 355 P.2d 641 (Cal. 1960) the court ruled
that the accused need lay no foundation, nor even show the statement was signed
or acknowledged by the witness as accurate. State v. Hutchins, 138 A.2d 342 (Del.
Super. 1957). State v. Weston, 232 La. 766, 95 So. 2d 305 (1957) (available only
after foundation for impeachment has been laid). People v. Salimone, 265 Mich.
486, 251 N.W. 594 (1933). In State v. Hunt, 25 N.J. 514, 138 A.2d 1 (1958)
the court ruled that the accused need not show the prior statement of the
witness is inconsistent with his testimony, it being sufficient that the prior state-
ment relates to the subject matter of his testimony. In People v. Walsh, 262 N.Y.
140, 186 N.E. 422 (1933), where the witness admitted on cross-examination that
he previously gave a statement to the district attorney, and the trial judge in-
spected it and found it inconsistent with his direct testimony, the court said that it
should usually be given to the accused unless it is privileged. Contra, State v. Yee
Guck, 99 Ore. 231, 195 Pac. 363 (1921), but the reason for this decision is not clear
since the statement was neither subscribed to nor authorized by the witness and
could not be used as substantive evidence or to impeach.
9. 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
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accused, not first to the trial judge for a determination of relevancy,' 0
emphasizing that if the Government refused to turn the statements over to
the defendant after having been ordered to do so by the trial court
the criminal action would have to be dismissed. Because of the furor
this case caused, especially with the Federal Bureau of Investigation
which feared this decision would force it to divulge the names of their
secret agents and informers and thus hamper their work, Congress
in 1957 passed the so-called "Jencks Act."" That this statute is now
the exclusive means by which production of the pre-trial statements of
a Government witness can be obtained in the federal courts was clearly
pointed out in Palermo v. United States.1 2 By way of comparison, it is
interesting to note the English view on the subject under discussion.
By statute, the accused is present when testimony is given before the
examining justices, who decide whether the accused should be committed
for trial. The accused is then permitted to ask the witnesses questions. 13
Furthermore, at trial, the accused is permitted to inspect all depositions,
present in court, which have been taken against him. 14 In the principal
case, the Vermont court considered the federal rule, and appeared to
accept the principle that an accused should be permitted to see the
statements of a witness after he has testified on direct examination, but
qualified this right by requiring such statements to be first turned over
to the trial judge for his inspection and determination of relevancy.
The court in the instant case apparently felt bound by the re-
strictive rule of the common law in disposing of the motion made at the
opening of the trial, but evidenced a willingness to deviate from this
rule when considering the motion made after direct examination. In
denying the latter motion for the reasons stated, the court appears to
have disregarded the purpose of evidentiary regulation. The rules of
10. The Court felt that only the accused could determine if these pre-trial state-
ments were relevant.
11. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1958). The statute modifies the holding in the Jencks
case as follows: (1) it allows the trial judge to make an in camera inspection of
the statement if the Government claims it does not relate to the subject matter of
the direct testimony, and to delete those portions which the court finds do not so
relate before giving the statement to the defendant, (2) unless the interests of
justice require a mistrial, to be decided by the judge in his discretion, if the Govern-
ment disobeys an order of the court to turn the statement over to the defendant, the
court will strike the testimony of the witness from the record and the trial will
proceed, and (3) the statute defines what is meant by "statement."
12. 360 U.S. 343, at 351 (1959). This case presents a good discussion of the
history and purpose of the Jeacks Act. For an examination of the federal rule
in this area see Comment, The Jencks Legislation: The Status of the Accused's Federal
Discovery Rights, 38 TEXAs L. Riv. 595 (1960) ; Comment, The Jencks Legislation:
Problems in Prospect, 67 YALE L.J. 674 (1958).
13. The Magistrates' Courts Act, 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz. 2 c. 55,§ 4(3). Dean Wigmore cominents that by modern practice no witness can be called
by the prosecution who was not examined before the trial. 6 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra
note 3, § 1850, at 394.
14. The Trials for Felony Act, 1836, 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 114, § 4. Noting the
English practice, Dean Wigmore says: "This practice represents a belief that such
inspection is in many situations nothing less than is required by fairness to an
innocent accused .. " 6 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 3, § 1850, at 395.
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evidence are exclusionary rules which become operative only when
determining the admissability of evidence. Therefore, no relevancy
question is presented by the motion in the instant case, and to require
such a determination before allowing inspection is seemingly premature.
The dichotomy which permeates the court's opinion is not easily recon-
ciled or grounded in reason. The difference between the two motions is
merely one of timing and not of substance. Since the court is evidently
satisfied that the main objections to a relaxing of the common law
rule, namely that it would reveal the identity of informers and encourage
perjury by the accused or his witnesses, are inapplicable when considering
a motion made after direct examination, it is difficult to perceive why
these objections are more substantial when the motion is made at the
opening of, or before the trial.15 It is apparent that virtually all juris-
dictions have overcome the fear of perjury in civil cases, where pre-trial
discovery is commonplace, and there seems to be no valid reason why
such anxiety should prevail in criminal cases.16 A fortiori, such appre-
hension is baseless when the motion to inspect statements of prosecution
witnesses is made at the trial.1 T Since the accused is asking to inspect
only statements of those who are to testify on behalf of the prosecution,
there can be no injurious consequence to effective law enforcement by
divulging the identity of informers. The prosecution has chosen to
reveal the identity of the informer at trial, so it matters not that he is
made known through this discovery process. Perhaps the time has come
when the prohibitory rule of the common law concerning criminal dis-
covery, at least as applied to motions like those in the instant case,
should be examined and re-evaluated in the light of reason and con-
temporary standards of justice.
Lewis H. Gold
15. Needless to say, the third main objection to criminal discovery, namely
that it will not work both ways since in many cases the accused will have the
protection of the Fifth Amendment, is not worthy of extensive discussion. The
court implicitly rejected this contention in laying down the rule as to discovery
after direct examination, and it would seemingly be just as inapplicable when
inspection is requested earlier.
16. Since the consequences of an adverse verdict in a criminal case are more
severe than a similar verdict in a civil case, it is argued that there is more reason
for the criminal defendant to perjure himself. Although this may be true in some
cases, the very basis of this contention presents a cogent reason for allowing
criminal discovery; i.e. the gravity of the punishment dictates a trial free from
secrecy and surprise.
17. As Dean Wigmore has said: "... why should there remain a privilege
to withhold at the trial when the danger of fabrication of false counter-evidence
has passed." 8 WIGMORs, EVID4NC. § 2224 (3d ed. 1940).
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HUSBAND AND WIFE-CONSORTIUM-WIFE DOES NOT HAVE A
CAUSE OF ACTION FOR NEGLIGENT INJURY TO HUSBAND.
Neuberg v. Bobowicz (Pa. 1960).
Plaintiff's husband sued for injuries incurred in an automobile acci-
dent alleging negligence on the part of the defendants, operators of two
vehicles involved. Plaintiff joined in the action and sought recovery for
the loss of her husband's consortium, brought about by the injuries he
received. The trial court sustained a demurrer and a motion to strike from
the complaint the prayer of the plaintiff, Mrs. Neuberg. On appeal, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, with Justice Musmanno dissenting,
affirmed the trial court, and held that there is no cause of action, in Penn-
sylvania, by a wife for the loss of her husband's consortium caused by the
negligent act of a third party. Neuberg v. Bobowicz, 401 Pa. 146, 162 A.2d
662 (1960).
Historically and according to the great weight of authority, al-
though a husband could maintain an action for the loss of his wife's
consortium due to negligent injury, the wife could not avail herself of a
similar remedy if her husband was negligently injured." Although in
most jurisdictions a wife is allowed to recover for an intentional inter-
ference with her consortium, this remedy has not been extended to allow
her to recover for a negligent interference. 2 At common law when a
woman married she lost certain rights, such as the right to keep her
earnings, to hold property in her own name, and to sue in her own name
for injuries she received.3 Because of this inability to sue, the question
of a wife's right to an independent cause of action for the loss of her
husband's consortium never arose. With the passage of the Married
Women's Acts4 and the increasing trend towards women's independence
and equality with men, suits for loss of consortium began to come before
the courts. The courts have expressed varied reasons in refusing to
allow the relief sought in the instant case. The most conservative view
for not allowing this cause of action has been that it is against the weight
of authority,5 and if any change in this area is desirable or demanded by
altered social conditions it is the duty of the legislature to act and to
1. PROSSER, TORTS 703-04 (2d ed. 1955).
2. PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 1, at 690-92. An overwhelming majority of
jurisdictions allow a wife to recover in actions for alienation of affections and
criminal conversation for. an intentional interference with her consortium.
3. The instant court's view of marriage is: "By marriage the husband and wife
are one person and the husband is that one." Neuberg v. Bobowicz, 401 Pa. 146,
150, 162 A.2d 662, 664 (1960).
4. II, Bishop, MARRIED WOMEN (1875).
5. Ripley v. Ewell, 61 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 1952); Malloy v. Foster, 169 Misc. 964,
8 N.Y.S.2d 608 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
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authorize such a recovery.6 Another ground advanced for the denial of
this action has been that even though the Married Women's Acts allow
a woman, during coverture, to have contractual and legal relationships
as if single, these acts merely removed the disability to sue and did not
create any new causes of action.7 The fear that damages will be du-
plicate4, because in the computation of the husband's damages, the jury
may take into account the value of his services to his wife and the im-
pairment of his ability to give his spouse care, comfort, and sexual com-
panionship, has deterred courts from granting this relief.8 The possibility
that allowing the wife to recover in these circumstances would open the
door to others who had a close relationship with the injured party,
such as his children, to bring similar suits for their loss of companionship
is an additional inducement to refuse recovery. 9 Some courts, moreover,
have determined that such an injury to the wife is indirect and conse-
quential and have on that basis denied the wife's right to this cause of
action. 10 It has been argued also that judicial recognition would work
retroactively and destroy the effect of many releases obtained in negli-
gence actions, because the wife who was not a party to such release
would now have a right to sue the negligent party." A few cases, de-
spite the reasons posed, have allowed a wife to recover for the loss of her
husband's consortium.'2 1n the first of these, Hitaffer v. Argonne Co.,'8
a federal circuit court recognized the right of a wife to this cause of
action, placing stress upon the spiritual and sentimental aspects of
6. Deshotel v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 50 Cal. 2d 664, 328 P.2d
449 (1958); Ripley v. Ewell, supra note 5; Patelski v. Synder, 179 Ill. App. 24
(1913) ; Best v. Samuel Fox & Co., [1951] 2 K.B. 639.
7. Patelski v. Synder, supra note 6; Cravens v. Louisville & N. R.R., 195
Ky. 257, 242 S.W. 628 (1922); Larocca v. American Chain & Cable Co., 23 N.J.
Super. 195, 92 A.2d 811 (1952); Malloy v. Foster, 169 Misc. 964, 8 N.Y.S.2d 608
(Sup. Ct. 1938).
8. Deshotel v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 50 Cal. 2d 664, 328 P.2d 449
(1958); Larocca v. American Chain & Cable Co., supra note 7; Neuberg v.
Bobowicz, 401 Pa. 146, 162 A.2d 662 (1960).
9. Patelski v. Snyder, 179 Ill. App. 24 (1913); Larocca v. American Chain &
Cable Co., supra note 8.
10. Deshotel v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 50 Cal. 2d 664, 328 P.2d
449 (1958); Feneff v. New York Cent. & H. R.R., 203 Mass. 278, 89 N.E. 463
(1909).
11. Deshotel v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., supra note 10; Ripley v.
Ewell, 61 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1952). Because the statute of limitations would bar
most of these actions, this objection is for the most part academic.
12. Missouri Pacific Trans. Co. v. Miller, 227 Ark. 351, 299 S.W.2d 41 (1957);
Acuff v. Schmidt, 248 Iowa 272, 78 N.W.2d 480 (1956); Montgomery v. Stephen,
359 Mich. 33, 101 N.W.2d 227 (1960).
13. Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340
U.S. 852 (1950). In so far as this case allowed recovery to the wife for loss of
consortium due to negligent injury it is still good law, but it has been overruled,
to the extent that it allowed this recovery when the husband is covered by
Workman's Compensation, by Smither & Co. v. Coles, 224 F.2d 220 (D.C. Cir.
1957), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 911 (1957). Recovery for loss of consortium was
allowed the wife previously in Hipp v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemoirs & Co., 182
N.C. 9, 108 S.E. 318 (1921), and Griffin v. Cinn. Realty Co., 27 Ohio Dec. 585;
but subsequently this recovery was denied and these cases were respectively over-
ruled by, Hinnant v. Tidewater Power Co., 189 N.C. 120, 126 S.E. 307 (1925), and
Smith v. Nicholas Bldg. Co., 93 Ohio St. 101, 112 N.E. 204 (1915).
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consortium rather than the elements of service that are also interwoven in
the fabric of this term.
The decisions in the field of negligent interference with consortium
are in a state of flux. The common law view that the husband had a cause
of action but the wife did not, though still followed by a majority of
jurisdictions, is losing favor. The courts that have repudiated this in-
equitable doctrine have gone to two extreme poles. One group, stressing
the sentimental aspects of consortium, has allowed both the husband
and wife to recover. 14 The other, stressing the right to services which
was the view that the common law took of consortium, not only have re-
fused the wife the right to recover but have also abrogated the husband's
cause of action.15 The court in the instant case says that the husband's
cause of action is based on outworn theory and its very existence de-
grades and makes the wife inferior to her husband; therefore it would
appear very possible that in the future it will follow the second view and
abolish the husband's right to recover.16 Nevertheless, the relationship
of husband and wife is an important one to our society. The family is the
foundation of our strength and the unit which educates our youth for the
future. It is evident that the marriage contract is considered as on a
higher plane than most ordinary contracts, for the state intervenes in
the formation of the marital bond and ordinarily allows rescission only
for the most grievious reasons. The rights which the parties receive
to love, companionship and sexual relations are much higher than the
rights which the parties to a contract would receive.' 7 It is a union that
is safeguarded and protected by our laws and it would seem that any
outside interference with the rights of the parties should be redressed.
It would appear the better rule, because of the unique and solemn
character of marriage, to follow the decision of the Hitaffer case and allow
both husband and wife to recover for a negligent interference with
consortium, the right to which is central to the marriage contract.
James G. Lepis
14. Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Acuff v. Schmit,
248 Iowa 272, 78 N.W.2d 480 (1956); Montgomery v. Stephan, 359 Mich. 33,
101 N.W.2d 227 (1960).
15. West v. City of San Diego, 353 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1960); Lockwood v.
Wilson H. Lee Co., 144 Conn. 155, 128 A.2d 330 (1956); Bolger v. Boston Elev.
Ry., 205 Mass. 420, 91 N.E. 389 (1910); Helmstetter v. Duke Power Co., 224
N.C. 821, 32 S.E.2d 611 (1945).
16. "If the husband's own right had first come in question as res integra
today, it would probably have been negatived." Neuberg v. Bobowicz, 401 Pa. 146,
157, 162 A.2d 662, 667 (1960).
17. Justice Musmanno, in his dissent argues that the right to her husband's
consortium is a right which the wife receives by the marriage contract. She has a
legally recognized right to his companionship, protection, and devotion and the law
should grant an adequate remedy for any violation of this right. Neuberg v.
Bobowicz, 401 Pa. 146, 160, 162 A.2d 662, 670 (1960) (dissenting opinion).
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LABOR LAW--INJUNCTIONS-EFFECT OF TAFT-HARTLEY ACT
ON INJUNCTION PROVISIONS OF NORRIS-LAGUARDIA ACT.
Teamsters Union v. Yellow Transit Freight Lines, Inc.
(10th Cir. 1960).
Appellee, an interstate motor carrier, brought an action in the
district court under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act
of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act)' to enjoin appellant labor union from
peacefully picketing appellee's terminal in violation of a collective bar-
gaining agreement. The agreement was between appellee as employer
and the union as bargaining representative of appellee's drivers, dockmen,
and warehousemen. Elaborate grievance procedures were established for
the settlement of all disputes arising under the agreement, which pro-
vided that there would be no resort to "strike, lock-out, tie-up, or legal
proceedings" without first exhausting all possible means of settlement as
provided by the agreement. The union, in an attempt to organize ap-
pellee's office and clerical employees, initiated peaceful picketing of
appellee's terminal facilities; union members honored the picket line, with
the result that appellee's terminal operations were tied-up. The union
contended that since the controversy involved a "labor dispute" within
the meaning of Section 13(c) of the Norris-LaGuardia Act,2 the court
was deprived of jurisdiction to give injunctive relief by Section 4 of that
Act.3 The district court found that the union was in violation of the
collective bargaining agreement, and held that the controversy did not
constitute a "labor dispute" under Norris-LaGuardia. The court of ap-
peals affirmed, holding that Section 301 gives federal courts jurisdiction
to enjoin violation of a no-strike clause in a collective bargaining agree-
ment, notwithstanding the restrictions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
Teamsters Union v. Yellow Freight Lines, Inc., 282 F.2d 345 (10th
Cir. 1960).
1. Labor management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 301(a), 61 Stat.
156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1958): "Suits for violations of contracts between
an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry af-
fecting commerce . . . may be brought in any district court of the United States
having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or
without regard to the citizenship of the parties."
2. Norris-LaGuardia Act § 13(c), 47 Stat. 73 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1958):
"The term 'labor dispute' includes any controversy . . . concerning the association or
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to
arrange terms or conditions of employment .. "
3. Norris-LaGuardia Act. § 4, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1958)
"No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining
order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out
of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or interested
in such dispute . . . from doing, whether singly or in concert, any of the following
acts: (a). Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation
of employment,.....
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The relationship of the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act with other federal labor legislation is a difficult and con-
troversial problem of long standing.4 Although the instant case raises this
problem in relation to the Taft-Hartley Act, considerable prior litigation
in this field has involved apparent conflict between Norris-LaGuardia and
the Railway Labor Act. 5 In those cases, the United States Supreme Court
has consistently sought to effectuate the underlying policy of the Railway
Labor Act rather than the literal provisions of Norris-LaGuardia. The
court has held, ". . that the Norris-LaGuardia Act did not deprive the
federal courts of jurisdiction to compel compliance with the positive
mandates of the Railway Labor Act. .. ." Thus, the courts may com-
pel a railroad to "treat" with the certified representative of its employees
as required by Section 2, Ninth, of the Railway Labor Act.7 In a series of
cases involving racial discrimination, the court construed the Railway
Labor Act as placing a positive obligation upon labor unions not to
make employment contracts which discriminate against employees be-
longing to racial minorities, and it held further that this obligation could
be injunctively enforced upon petition of the injured parties., In Brother-
hood of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago Riv. and Ind. R.R., 9 perhaps the
most significant case yet decided in this field, the Supreme Court held that
Norris-LaGuardia does not preclude a federal court from enjoining a
railway strike over a "minor dispute," that is a dispute over the appli-
cation of an existing collective bargaining agreement.' 0 The Railway
Labor Act provides for the submission of such disputes to the National
Railroad Adjustment Board, the decisions of which are binding upon
both parties." On this basis, a district court has said that it has juris-
diction to enjoin a strike over a "major dispute,"' 2 that is one involving the
4. Virginian Ry. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937). See also
Cox, Current Problems in the Law of Grievance Arbitration, 30 RocKY MT. L. Rzv.
247 (1958) ; Cox, Grievance Arbitration in the Federal Courts, 67 HARV. L. Rev. 591
(1954) ; Note, 72 HARV..L. Rxv. 354 (1958).
5. Railway Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 48 Stat. 1185 (1934),
45 U.S.C. §§ 151 to 188 (1958).
6. Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, 338 U.S. 232,
237 (1949).
7. Virginian Ry. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937), con-
struing Railway Labor Act § 2, Ninth, 44 Stat. 578 (1926), as amended, 48 Stat.
1188 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1958).
8. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952) ; Graham
v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, 338 U.S. 232 (1949);
Turnstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210
(1944); Steele v. Louisville and N. R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
9. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago Riv. & Ind. R.R., 353 U.S.
30 (1957).
10. The terms "minor dispute" and "major dispute" are not used in the Rail-
way Labor Act. They have developed from the different provisions made in the
act for the settlement of disputes arising out of an existing contract as opposed
to those arising in the negotiation of a contract. See Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley,
325 U.S. 711 (1945); Baltimore & O.R.R. v. United Railroad Workers, 170 F. Supp.
53 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
11. Railway Labor Act § 3, First (i) (m), 44 Stat. 578 (1926), as amended,
48 Stat. 1189 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 153 (i) (m).
12. See note 10 supra.
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negotiation of a collective bargaining agreement, if the parties have not
exhausted all the means provided by the Railway Labor Act for the
peaceful settlement of such disputes.',
The Norris-LaGuardia problem assumed a new dimension with the
enactment of Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947. By conferring
jurisdiction upon the federal courts in cases arising from violations of
collective bargaining agreements, without specifying whether such juris-
diction extends to the issuance of injunctions, Congress created a serious
ambiguity in our national labor policy. In the land-mark case of Textile
Workers v. Lincoln Mills,14 the Supreme Court held that Section 301
not only gives the federal courts jurisdiction in these cases, but also
authorizes them to construct a body of federal law for the enforcement of
collective bargaining agreements. Specifically, the court held that this
section embraced the power to fashion a remedy and to compel specific
performance of an agreement to arbitrate disputes. The difficulty of
Norris-LaGuardia was disposed of on the ground that the Act was never
intended to apply to judicial enforcement of arbitration agreements. The
court reasoned that a refusal to observe such an agreement is not one of
the acts protected by Section 4,15 that the procedural requirements of
Section 716 are "inapposite" to such a case, and that Section 817 clearly
indicates a congressional policy in favor of arbitration of labor disputes.
This analysis has found general acceptance as far as arbitration agreements
are concerned. 18 Prior to Lincoln Mills however, the courts were un-
willing to apply similar reasoning to cases involving enjoinder of strikes
or peaceful picketing.' 9 Since the decision in that case, at least one
13. See American Airlines Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 169 F. Supp. 777(S.D.N.Y. 1958 (dictum).
14. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
15. See note 3 supra.
16. Norris-LaGuardia Act § 7, 47 Stat. 71 (1932), U.S.C. § 107 (1958),
specifically requires that before a federal court can issue an injunction in a labor
dispute, concerning matters not within the absolute prohibition of § 4, it must
find that threatened unlawful acts will be committed which will irreparably injure
complainant's property, and for which there is no adequate remedy at law. The
inapplicability of this to a failure to arbitrate seems clear.
17. Norris-LaGuardia Act § 8, 47 Stat. 72 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 108 (1958),
denies njunctive relief to any party to a labor dispute who has not made "every
reasonable effort to settle such dispute, including 'voluntary arbitration.'"
18. Goodall-Sanford Inc. v. United Textile Workers, 233 F.2d 104 (1st Cir.
1956) ; Local 205, UEW v. Gen. Elec. Co., 233 F.2d 85 (1st Cir. 1956); Milk
and Ice Cream Drivers Union v. Gillespie Prod. Corp., 203 F.2d 650 (6th Cir.
1953) ; Textile Workers v. American Thread Co., 113 F. Supp. 137 (D.C. Mass.
1953). But see the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Textile Workers
v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 461 (1957).
19. W. L. Mead, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 217 F.2d 6 (1st Cir.
1954); In re Third Ave. Transit Corp., 192 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1951); Alcoa S.S.
Co. v. McMahon, 173 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1949), "cert. denied, 338 U.S. 821 (1949) ;
Sound Lumber Co. v. Lumber and Sawmill Workers, 122 F. Supp. 925 (N.D.
Cal. 1954). Two cases not involving work stoppages but supporting the same
general view are: Associated Tel. Co. v. Communication Workers, 114 F. Supp. 334
(S.D. Cal. 1953) ; United Packing House Workers v. Wilson & Co., 80 F. Supp.
563 (N.D. Ill. 1948).
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court has adhered to its former position.20 In the instant case however,
the court reaches an opposite conclusion, and holds that specific enforce-
ment of "no-strike" agreements is within the "body of federal law" to
which the Supreme Court referred in Lincoln Mills. This is, as yet,
clearly a minority position, but it is one which draws considerable sup-
port from both the Railway Labor Act cases discussed above and from
the Lincoln Mills holding.
The court relied upon both the Lincoln Mills case and the Railway
Labor Act cases in reaching the instant decision,21 but it will be seen
that this approach is not free of difficulty. The holding in Lincoln Mills
was a narrow one, and it does not necessarily follow that, because an
agreement to arbitrate is specifically enforceable, an agreement not to
strike is enforceable in the same way. Work stoppages and picketing are
among the acts specifically exempted from restraining orders and in-
junctions by Section 4 of Norris-LaGuardia; failure to arbitrate is not.
On the contrary, Section 8 of that statute expresses congressional favor
of arbitration.2 2  The procedural limitations which Section 723 of the
Act places upon the courts in the issuance of injunctions are, by their
nature, applicable to the enjoining of positive unlawful acts, such as
violent picketing, rather than to negative acts such as a refusal to arbitrate. 24
In Local 205, UEW v. General Elec. Co.,2 5 Judge Magruder, speaking for
the First Circuit, held arbitration agreements specifically enforceable; in
W. L. Mead, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters,26 the same jurist
concluded that a strike in violation of a collective bargaining agreement
could not be enjoined. In the former case, Judge Magruder pointed out
that Norris-LaGuardia was aimed at "the traditional labor injunction,
typically an order which prohibits or restricts unilateral coercive conduct
of either party to a labor dispute,"' 27 an accurate description of the order
in the instant case. He went on to add that, ".... an order to compel arbitra-
20, A. H. Bull. S.S. Co. v. Seafarer's Int'l Union, 250 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1957).
See also McCarrol v. Council of Carpenters, 49 Cal. 2d 45, 315 P.2d 322 (1957),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958).
21. Teamsters Union v. Yellow Transit Freight Lines, Inc., 282 F.2d 345, 349
(10th Cir. 1960).
22. See note 17 supra.
23. See note 16 supra.
24. "These provisions were obviously aimed to limit injunctions to cases in-
volving violent or destructive acts. . . . The enumerated requisites . . . are not
at all compatible with the situation where one party merely demands that the other
be compelled to arbitrate a grievance in accordance with a contract provision for
arbitration, in which latter situation the required findings seldom, if ever, could be
made either affirmatively or negatively." Local 205, UEW v. Gen. Elec. Co., 233
F.2d 85, 92 (1st Cir. 1956).
25. Local 205, UEW v. Gen. Elec. Co., 233 F.2d 85 (1st Cir. 1956), aff'd,
Gen. Elec. Co. v. Local 205, UEW, 253 U.S. 547 (1957).
26. W. L. Mead, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 217 F.2d 6 (Ist Cir.
1954).
27. Local 205, UEW v. Gen. Elec. Co., 233 F.2d 85, 91 (lst Cir. 1956).
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tion of an existing dispute ... seems to have a different character what-
ever name is given to it."' 28
The analogy drawn between the instant case and the Railway Labor
Act cases would also seem to be a questionable one. The Railway Labor
Act created a comprehensive regulatory scheme, designed not only to
promote the peaceful settlement of disputes and prevent interruptions to
the flow of commerce, but also to protect the rights and interests of railway
'workers.29 In the matter of labor disputes, the act provides special ma-
chinery designed to compromise them to protect the interests of all parties A
There are no comparable provisions for the peaceful settlement of disputes
in Taft-Hartley, except in the case of labor disputes constituting a
"national emergency."''3 In the words of Mr. Chief Justice Warren,
... the machinery of the Railway Labor Act channeled these economic
forces, in matters dealing with railway labor, into special processes in-
tended to compromise them."832 The Taft-Hartley Act does not purport to
accomplish such a channeling. It provides no similar processes for the
settlement of "major disputes" and "minor disputes." Railway labor
enjoys the benefit of these "special processes," and, until it has exhausted
them, does not require the protection of Norris-LaGuardia. However,
in the case of strikes outside of the railway labor field, there is no com-
parable machinery for peaceful settlement provided by Taft-Hartley, in
the event such strike is enjoined. The need for protection against the
"labor injunction" is clearly greater in the Taft-Hartley cases than in the
Railway Labor Act cases.
The court in the instant case rejects the position of the district
court that the controversy involved did not arise out of a statutory
"labor dispute," 33 a conclusion which would seem to be demanded by the.
broad provisions of Section 13(c) of Norris-LaGuardia.34 Its holding,
therefore, can be sustained only upon the conclusion that Section 301 of
Taft-Hartley amounted to a pro tanto repeal of Norris-LaGuardia. This
position, previously rejected by the First and Second Circuits. 5 amounts,.
28. Ibid. Query, if a union can be judicially compelled to arbitrate, but cannot
be enjoined from simultaneously striking, of what real value is arbitration to the
employer? See Cox, Current Problems in the Law of Grievance Arbitration, 30
ROcKY MT. L. Rzv. 247, 255 (1958); Note, 72 H~Av. L. Rsv. 354, 365 (1958).
29. Railway Labor Act § 2, 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended 48 Stat. 1187(1934), 45 U.S.C. § 151(a) (1958).
30. Railway Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended 48 Stat. 1185 (1934),
45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1958).
31. Labor Management Relations Act §§ 206-210, 61 Stat. 155 (1947), 29-
U.S.C. §§ 176-180 (1958), provides machinery for the settlement of disputes con-
stituting a "national emergency."
32. Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen; v. Chicago Riv. & Ind. R.R., 353 U.S.
30, 41 (1957).
33. Teamsters Union v. Yellow Transit Freight Lines, Inc., 282 F.2d 345, 348:
(10th Cir. 1960).
34. See note 2 supra. See also Aetna Freight Lines v. Clayton, 228 F.2d 384.(2d Cir. 1955), holding peaceful organizational picketing to be within the scope of
§ 13(c).
35. A.H. Bull S.S. Co. v. Seafarer's Int'l Union, 250 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1957);
W. L. Mead, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters 217 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1954).
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in the language of Judge Magruder, to a repeal by implication of "a sig-
nificant and tremendously important piece of legislation which the Con-
gress evidently had specifically in mind when it came to enact the Labor
Management Relations Act in 1947. ' '36 The theory of implied repeal is
further weakened by the fact that Taft-Hartley specifically waives the
limitations of Norris-LaGuardia in certain instances.37 The Lincoln Mills
decision points out that agreements not to strike are frequently quid pro
quo for agreements to arbitrate ;38 on this basis the court in the instant
case concluded that if the latter are specifically enforceable, the former
should be also. This, however, does not eliminate the obstacle of the
specific provisions of Section 4 of Norris-LaGuardia, and the merits.of such
an argument are clearly for Congress to determine. It would seem,
therefore, that if this important and well-settled principle of national labor
policy is to be changed, it should be done by act of Congress, rather than
by "judicial legislation or inventiveness. '"3 9
John J. Cannon
TRADE REGULATIONS-FAIR TRADE-MAJOR OIL PRODUCER MUST
SHOW FREE AND OPEN COMPETITION TO OBTAIN INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
FROM PRICE CUTTING BY NONSIGNER DEALER.
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Mays (Pa. 1960).
Gulf Oil instituted this action against Claude Mays, an independent
'Gulf dealer, to enjoin sales of Gulf gasoline at prices lower than those
stipulated by Fair Trade agreements between Gulf and other Pennsyl-
vania dealers. Gulf alleged in its complaint that it was in free and
,open competition with gasoline produced by others, and this allegation
was admitted by Mays' answer. Consequently no evidence on this point
was presented at the final hearing before the Common Pleas Court of
Berks County at which Gulf was granted a permanent injunction. On
appeal the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, without directing itself to any
of Mays' defenses and with two justices dissenting, reversed and remanded
with instructions that Gulf must prove to the satisfaction of the court
36. W. L. Mead, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 217 F.2d 6, 9 (1st Cir.
1954).
37. Thus the provisions of Norris-LaGuardia are expressly waived by § 10(h)
-of Taft-Hartley in actions by the National Labor Relations Board for the enjoining
.of unfair labor practices, 61 Stat. 149 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(h) (1958), and by
.§ 208(b) of that Act in actions by the Attorney General for the enjoining of a
"national emergency" strike, 61 Stat. 155 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 178(b) (1958).
38. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957).
39. A. H. Bull S.S. Co. v. Seafarer's Int'l Union, 250 F.2d 326, 332 (2d Cir.
1957).
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that it is in fact engaged in free and open competition. Because of a
necessity for strict compliance with the letter of the Fair Trade laws
and because of the state's interest in preventing unlawful price fixing,
the court would not accept a stipulation by the parties as satisfying this
statutory condition imposed upon Fair Trade agreements.1 Gulf Oil Corp.
v. Mays, No. 157 Jan. Term, Sup. Ct. Pa., October 10, 1960.
In the absence of Fair Trade statutes, price fixing agreements are
per se violations of the Sherman Act and adverse to the economic
philosophy of antitrust legislation.2 Prior to 1937 several states had
enacted Fair Trade Acts similar to that of Pennsylvania, but without
federal accord these statutes could apply only to articles of intra-state
commerce. In 1937 Congress lowered that barrier to Fair Trade by
passing the Miller-Tydings amendment as an "exception" to the Sherman
Act,8 thus allowing states to sanction vertical price fixing4 where there
is a brand or trade mark to be protected which is in free and open
competition. In 1952 the McGuire amendment to the Federal Trade
Act enlarged the scope of this antitrust exception to permit enforcement
of Fair Trade prices against nonsigning distributors and dealers.5 The
constitutionality of this type of legislation has withstood attacks under
the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution, on the
grounds that it is a valid exercise of the police power protecting the
producer's interest in his trade mark, and eliminating "loss-leader" selling.0
Pennsylvania's Fair Trade Act7 was passed in 1941 and amended in
1956. Its constitutionality has been upheld on the same grounds.8 Al-
though the Pennsylvania court has passed on several aspects of the
Fair Trade Act,9 until the case of Sinclair Refining Co. v. Schwartz,10
1. Majority opinion, page 6. "Even though the admission here is made in an
adversary proceeding, still the state's interest in seeing that unlawful price fixing
is not indulged in is of such importance that the mere admission by the adversary
is not sufficient to provide the essential prerequisites necessary to invoke the
statutory rights and exemptions provided by the act."
2. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1910).
3. 50 Stat. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1959).
4. Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183(1936). A vertical price fixing agreement is one between enterprises in successive
stages of economic activity, i.e., between manufacturer and wholesalers, or either of
these and retailers. Horizontal price fixing agreements are between parties on
the same economic level, i.e., between manufacturers or between wholesalers or
between retailers.
5. 66 Stat. 632 (1952), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1959).
6. Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183,193-95 (1936). Drastic price cuts on one product to attract customers and encourage
sales of other products are called "loss-leader" sales. This practice hurts the pro-
ducer because the public is no longer satisfied to buy at the regular market price
of other dealers.
7. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 7, 8 (Supp. 1959).
8. Burch Co. v. General Electric Co., 382 Pa. 370, 115 A.2d 361 (1955).
9. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp. v. L & H Stores, Inc., 392 Pa. 221, 139 A.2d
897 (1958). Injunctive relief was considered the only effective means of enforcing
the Fair Trade Act. Damage to the producer is not necessary where "good will"
is shown and the injury thereto will ordinarily be presumed if there is price cutting.
Lentheric, Inc. v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 338 Pa. 523, 13 A.2d 12 (1940).
Woolworth was enjoined from selling rebottled perfume (but still under the
26
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it had not directly considered the question of free and open competition.
In that case the court found no problem in accepting gasoline as within
the protection of the Act as a commodity," but reversed a decree granting
preliminary injunctive relief to Sinclair and remanded with instructions
that Sinclair show that it suffered sufficient harm to warrant such re-
lief, and that it was engaged in free and open competition. 12 Unlike
the instant case, Sinclair's allegation of a competitive market had been
contested in the lower court. It does not appear that other courts have
handled the question of free and open competition in the gasoline in-
dustry or in any industry of similar marketing structure. In the few
cases concerning construction of the requirement, the courts indicate
that the provision is intended as a safeguard against price fixing where
one producer has a monopoly, even a lawful monopoly,' 8 and against
horizontal price fixing which is unlawful per se.14 Standards to be applied
in determining the presence of this required competitive field are far
from established.
The majority in the instant case joins with numerous authority in
asserting that uniform business conduct, often called "conscious parallel-
ism," is probative - but not conclusive - evidence of price fixing.' 5
Some courts have held that price leadership, high price levels, price
imilarity and/or high producer profits are not proof of lack of competi-
tion and are open to conflicting inferences.' 6 One court observed that
price is not the sole factor: "Quality, appearance, effectiveness, service
Lentheric trade mark) at 10 cents for bottles containing less than one ounce. The
Fair Trade price was 50 cents for all such bottles.
Bristol-Myers Co. v. Lit Brothers, Inc., 336 Pa. 81, 6 A.2d 843 (1939). The
court held that the distribution of trading stamps was not a price cut and could be
given without violation of stipulated prices.
10. 398 Pa. 60, 157 A.2d 63 (1959).
11. Id. at 63, 157 A.2d at 64. Mr. Justice Bok said: "We are told that gasoline
has not yet been before our courts, and that appears to be so. There is no difficulty
about accepting it within the protection of the Act, since Section 4 defines
"commodity" as "any subject of commerce," and the subject of the Act is "any
commodity."
12. Id. at 63, 64, 157 A.2d at 64.
13. Eastman Kodak Co. v. FTC, 158 F.2d 592 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied,
330 U.S. 828 (1947). Kodak color film was not in free and open competition when
no one else produced color film, nor was Kodak's film magazine when only that film
would fit Kodak's camera.
14. United States v. McKesson & Robbins, 351 U.S. 305 (1956). The court
held that the Miller-Tydings and McGuire Acts did not allow price fixing between
competing parties, i.e., horizontal price fixing, and that any contracts of this nature
are illegal per se. Accord, Eastman Kodak Co. v. Schwartz, 133 N.Y.S.2d 908
(Sup. Ct. 1954).
15. Ar'Y GEN. NAT'L COMM. ANTITRUST Ri ., 36-42 (1955). "'Conscious
parallelism' is a phrase of uncertain meaning and legal significance. For some it is
an inartful label for one type of evidence which may or may not be relevant in
proof of conspiracy. In this sense, 'conscious' may mean no more than knowledge
that a particular course of conduct has been followed by competitors. And 'parallelism'
may be used as a synonym for 'collusion' or only to signify uniformity of business
behavior, where 'uniformity' is a neutral term."
16. Scovill Mfg. Co. v. Skaggs Pay Less Drug Store, 45 Cal. 2d 881, 291 P.2d
936, 941 (1955); General Electric Co. v. Superior Court of California, 45 Cal. 2d
897, 291 P.2d 945, 948 (1955).
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and .many other factors figure in the competitive picture." 17 But, since
here the burden is placed upon the party claiming under the Act, it
may be that not even these vague standards apply, for they are directed
at disproving rather than proving competition. If the opinion is to be
narrowly interpreted it may be sufficient that Gulf show that it is not
in competition with Mays and that it is not a party to any agreement
or conspiracy to fix prices. However, proof of such negative proposi-
tions would be an extremely difficult undertaking in even the most
competitive markets. If the opinion is given a broader interpretation
the lower court is faced with an unprecedented problem of determining
what Gulf must prove to qualify for fair trade, and Gulf still faces the
same and perhaps impossible challenge of producing such proof. Since
it is doubtful that the court would intentionally sanction such chaos, the
narrower construction, which at least draws some guide for court and
parties, appears more realistic.
Remanding for further proof of a fact admitted below by both
parties in an adversary proceeding is, to say the very least, unique.18
However, for the purpose of this limited discussion it is assumed, but with
no foreclosed conviction, that perhaps such action is not an abuse of
power where the court would prefer to consider what may be a major
policy question on a proved rather than hypothetical fact situation. What-
-ever may have prompted the remand, when the instant case is con-
sidered against: the background of the Sinclair case, it becomes fairly
obvious that the court intends to severely test and scrutinize the exercise
of Fair Trade price fixing by the petroleum industry. This examination may
continue even if Gulf is successful in proving free and open competition.
Dicta in the majority opinion hint that the constitutional underpinnings
of the nonsigner provisions are not yet settled as applied to the petroleum
market. The court expressed doubt that the dangers of "loss-leader"
practices and trade mark prestige damage are really present in the
'industry. Their doubts are predicted upon the court's own assumptions
that "loss-leader" sales cannot occur where a station carries only one
brand of products, and that often the gasoline sold is not that of the
company whose name appears on the pump. It is difficult to see a signifi-
cant distinction between a price cut on gasoline to attract a larger oil,
17. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Home Utilities Co., 234 F.2d 766, 770 (4th Cir.
1956).
18. "A fact alleged in a bill of complaint which is expressly admitted in the
answer requires no proof." 8 STANDARD PENNSYLVANIA PRACrIc9 § 357 (Supp.
1957). However, most cases cited in support of this proposition are ones where
some evidence was introduced. Drab v. Jaffe, 351 Pa. 297, 41 A.2d 407 (1945);
Allegheny Gas Co. v. Kemp,'316 Pa. 97, 174 Atl. 289 (1934). It must be granted
that there are no express holdings that the court cannot or will not remand in
the present situation. Still, the extension of the instant case could develop absurb
problems in determining what admitted facts must still be proved.
It should be noted that it was to this question that Mr. Justice Jones, B. R.,
directed his dissenting opinion in the instant case, with which Mr. Justice Bell
concurred.
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tire and battery business, and a price cut on canned corn to stimulate sales
of other normally stocked grocery products. Even though the automo-
tive products may share their production source and brand name, though
this is not always the situation, it still seems unavoidable that the evils
of "loss-leader" sales remain imminent.19 Nevertheless, even if these as-
sumptions can be established factually, it does not necessarily follow that
there is no longer a need for trade mark protection. As long as Gulf's
name appears on the pump, its vulnerability to prestige damage remains
constant and does not vary with the unknown name of the producer of
the fuel within the pump.20 It may also be worthy of note that some
courts and commentators are turning away from the original Fair Trade
justifications of safeguarding producers and their trade marks, and are
favoring justification on the basis that small businesses and the consuming
public are the chief recipients of Fair Trade protection.21 The Pennsyl-
vania court has not yet been committed to support or reject this embryonic
theory.
The majority opinion further observes that it has not yet investigated
"whether the overriding federal legislation [the Miller-Tydings and
McGuire Acts] exempted gasoline from antitrust condemnation." If the
court is concerned, as they apparently are, over whether these acts
included gasoline within their scope, such alarm can be easily quieted.
These acts, in effect, sanction the Fair Trade acts and policies of the
several states where they include and combine the required elements. If
the gasoline is characterized by a brand name and is sold in free and
open competition, then the only question is whether gasoline as a
product is also included within the scope of the Pennsylvania act, which
question the court has already answered in the affirmative. 22
Perhaps the court is troubled by an underlying problem the solu-
tion of which does not rest within its power. Although the Fair Trade
Acts appear to include all brand name products that are in free and open
competition, the production and marketing structure of some industries
renders them unsuited for price maintenance. The petroleum industry and
similar oligopies may exist in such a climate and perhaps the widely
inclusive language of the state and federal statutes should be particularized.
But to effect this goes beyond the scope of judicial construction, requiring
legislative selection from conflicting theories of economics. 28
James L. McHugh, Jr.
19. See supra, note 6.
20. Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183,
194 (1936). "Appellants own the commodity; they do not own the trade mark or
the good will that the trade mark symbolizes. And good will is property in a very
real sense ......
21. See, 36 CORNELL L.Q., 781 (1951).
22. See supra, note 10.
23. The wisdom of the Fair Trade laws as applied to any commodity is still
the subject of controversy. The opposition may even be increasing. See, ATT', GEN.
NAT'L COMM. ANTITRUST REP., 153-154 (1955). Herman, Fair Trade: Origin,
Purposes, and Competitive Effects, 27 Gso. WASH. L. REv. 621 (1958).
WINTER 1960-61 ]
29
Editors: Recent Decisions
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1961
